I Introduction
Household (non-institutional) investors reallocate wealth to stocks after stock prices rise: Figure   1 displays this well-known e¤ect of recent stock market returns on net in ‡ows to equity mutual funds. Such "return chasing" by household investors is a robust empirical phenomenon (Ippolito 1992; Chevalier and Ellison 1997; Sirri and Tufano 1998; Teo and Woo 2004; Frazzini and Lamont 2008; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick 2009; Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman 2011) and underlies a class of models seeking to explain asset pricing anomalies (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman 1990; Hong and Stein 1999; Barberis and Shleifer 2003; Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer forthcoming). This paper investigates why households chase stock market returns.
When asked, households report expectations consistent with a "ride the bubble" strategy of buying stocks at the beginning of a market rally and selling stocks at the beginning of a market decline, also called "greater fool" and "buy low, sell high" strategies (Harrison and Kreps 1978; Frankel and Froot 1990; Lamont and Thaler 2003) . Speci…cally, household investors report expectations of short-run stock market momentum (Amromin and Sharpe 2014; Greenwood and Shleifer 2014) and medium-run reversals, suggesting that households believe they can beat the market by timing their exit and entry (Vissing-Jorgensen 2003) . For example, the Yale Stock Market Con…dence Index survey (2014) …nds that near the end of the late-1990s market rally, half or more of household investors stated that stock prices exceeded fundamental value but that prices would nevertheless rise over the next year. 1 Similarly, UBS/Gallup surveys show that household investors' stated expectations of the one-year stock market return declined ten percentage points between 2000 and 2003 while stated expectations of the annualized ten-year return declined only two per-centage points (Vissing-Jorgensen); short-run momentum combined with long-run stability implies medium-run reversals.
If household investors chase returns in order to bene…t from temporary stock market rallies and to avoid temporary declines ("ride-the-bubble intentions"), they will not chase returns into illiquid assets that lock owners into a speci…c equity position for several years at a time. I test this prediction using the time series of in ‡ows to U.S. annuities. Annuities in the United States are sold by life insurers but are not annuities in the traditional economic sense: only 3% of the $2.5 trillion of U.S. annuity assets are annuitized into lifetime income streams. Instead, annuities are tax-preferred savings vehicles into which households nearing retirement make large one-time contributions; 10.5% of Americans over sixty years old have an annuity. Households choose either a …xed (…xed-return) annuity or a variable (equity-linked) annuity at the time of contribution and face substantial early withdrawal fees until the pre-speci…ed maturity of typically …ve to ten years.
Households can costlessly reallocate balances across asset classes within variable annuities but not within …xed annuities. Hence, a rise in aggregate …xed annuity in ‡ows re ‡ects households locking additional wealth out of the stock market for several years at a time. 2 This paper uses quarterly data on aggregate …xed annuity in ‡ows from 1986 to 2006 to test whether past S&P returns negatively a¤ect …xed annuity in ‡ows, inconsistent with ride-the-bubble intentions and consistent instead with buy-and-hold intentions. I …nd that past S&P returns have a large negative e¤ect on …xed annuity in ‡ows: one-standard-deviation-lower S&P returns last year, two years ago, three years ago, and four years ago reduce the current quarter's …xed annuity in ‡ows by 17%, 13%, 9%, and 5%, respectively, amounting to an annual reduction of $32 billion on a base of $72 billion. In fact, lagged S&P returns explain most of the time series variation in …xed annuity in ‡ows. This e¤ect is not an overall annuity e¤ect: S&P returns have a similarly strong negative e¤ect on the …xed annuity share of total (…xed plus variable) annuity in ‡ows and a similarly strong positive e¤ect on variable annuity in ‡ows. I conclude that household investors chase returns even into …xed annuities, in spite of their illiquidity and inconsistent with ride-the-bubble intentions.
This basic …nding could in principle be limitedly consequential if households use their nonannuity …nancial assets to o¤set their …xed annuity allocations, leaving their overall equity exposures their overall equity exposure over the same period. Hence, the household decision to invest in a …xed annuity is associated with a large reduction in the household's overall equity exposure.
In a …nal descriptive exercise that quanti…es one candidate explanation of the results, I use the time series of …xed annuity in ‡ows to parameterize a reduced-form model of expectation formation.
Under the strong assumption that household demand for …xed annuities is a¢ ne in the expected long-run equity premium akin to the a¢ ne portfolio rules in Kim and Omberg (1996) and Viceira (1999) , the sensitivity of …xed annuity in ‡ows to lagged S&P returns implies that the average annuity investor behaves as if she raises her expectation of the long-run equity return by 6.6%, 5.1%, 3.7%, and 2.0% of the …rst-through-fourth S&P lags. Such long-run extrapolation of recent stock market returns would accord with households'choices for …nancial advice during stock market rallies and would imply large revisions over time in expectations of the long-run equity return, including an 8. time variation in expected returns, risk aversion (e.g. due to wealth changes), and discount factors could each have driven the observed variation in …xed annuity in ‡ows and are equivalent in standard models. Regardless of the underlying source, return chasing into illiquid assets is inconsistent with ride-the-bubble intentions.
This paper connects to several strands in the literature. An in ‡uential set of papers documents return chasing into liquid …nancial assets. Ippolito (1992) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Sirri and Tufano (1998) , Teo and Woo (2004) , and Frazzini and Lamont (2008) document strong e¤ects of mutual fund past performance on subsequent fund in ‡ows. Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009) show that household investors chase their own historical 401(k) returns when choosing their 401(k) savings rates, and Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011) show that household investors chase their own historical IPO returns when choosing whether to bid on subsequent IPOs. 4 Greenwood and Nagel (2009) demonstrate similar return chasing by inexperienced mutual fund managers. Schultz (2003) , Baker and Wurgler (2006) , and Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012) present evidence consistent with …rms taking advantage of return chasers by issuing stock at temporary stock price peaks. This paper contributes to this literature by using ‡ows into a prominent illiquid …nancial asset…xed annuities-to investigate the motives underlying return chasing. The …nding that household investors chase stock market returns into illiquid assets indicates that return chasing is not just driven by intentions to ride a temporary bubble. Instead, recent stock market returns strongly a¤ect household decisions to lock wealth out of the stock market for several years at a time.
Though Americans rarely annuitize wealth into …xed lifetime income streams (Modigliani 1986; Brown 2009 ), my analysis is most closely related to contemporaneous work by Previtero (2014) who shows that poor recent stock market returns increase annuitization rates. He notes that poor 4 The exception in this literature is that the reverse pattern is observed among individual securities already owned by the household investor (Shefrin and Statman 1985; Odean 1998). stock market returns also seem to increase …xed annuity in ‡ows, but his paper is not fundamentally concerned with testing return-chasing motives, does not evaluate alternative explanations using variable annuity in ‡ows, and does not test for o¤setting allocations at the household level.
A similarly large theoretical literature considers the implications of trend extrapolation on asset prices. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) ; Fuster, Hebert, and Laibson (2011), Hirshleifer and Yu (2013) , and Alti and Tetlock (2014) model asset prices when some investors extrapolate trends in fundamentals. Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990) , Hong and Stein (1999) , Barberis and Shleifer (2003) , and Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (forthcoming) allow for a class of investors who extrapolate returns. In addition to providing new evidence of household return chasing, this paper motivates a distinction between investors who extrapolate returns only into the short run and those who extrapolate returns into the long run, with potential implications for liquidity premia.
The results provide a mixed view of the reliability of household investors'stated expectations.
Recent stock market returns have a large e¤ect on households'reported expectations of the one-year stock market return (Amromin and Sharpe 2014; Greenwood and Shleifer 2014 ) but a small e¤ect on reported expectations of the ten-year market return (Vissing-Jorgensen 2003) . Yet the return chasing estimated in this paper is consistent with a large e¤ect of recent market returns on expected long-run market returns as well, raising the possibility that households misreport their long-run expectations, in line with earlier skepticism (Campbell 2003; Lamont 2003; Cochrane 2011). 5 Finally, a small but growing literature asks what incentives (Du ‡o, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and Saez 2006), defaults (Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick 2009) , and other interventions like information provision (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011) may reduce the welfare costs of apparent investment mistakes (Campbell 2006) . This paper indicates that households use annuities to 5 One possibility is that household investors are more con…dent in short-run than long-run market momentum. make large sudden changes in equity allocations based on recent stock market returns. This raises the possibility that subsidizing small annual retirement contributions (as in 401(k) accounts and Individual Retirement Accounts) generates more balanced household portfolios over time than subsidizing large one-time contributions (as in annuities).
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides institutional background on U.S. annuities. Section III describes the data. Section IV presents the main results. Section V evaluates robustness. Section VI documents the relevance of annuity investments for household portfolio allocations. Section VII provides an interpretation of the results. Section VIII concludes.
II Institutional Background on U.S. Annuities
I test for return chasing into illiquid assets using quarterly in ‡ows into U.S. annuities. Annuities in the United States are not annuities in the traditional economic sense: Americans rarely annuitize their retirement assets into lifetime income streams (Modigliani 1986; Brown 2009 ), and only $79 billion (3.1%) of the $2.45 trillion of U.S. annuity assets are annuitized into lifetime income streams (LIMRA 2013) . Rather, U.S. annuities are several-year investment vehicles that o¤er tax deferral on investment income at the expense of substantial early withdrawal fees. The pre-speci…ed durations are typically …ve to ten years; shorter durations are rare because tax deferral yields little value over short horizons. Annuities must be provided by a life insurance company in order to qualify for tax deferral and are not federally insured. 6 Annuities share key features of 401(k) accounts and IRAs-tax deferral and a 10% federal tax penalty on nominal earnings if distributions are made before age 59.5-but are inferior to those other retirement accounts because annuity contributions are made with post-tax assets and nominal earnings are subject to income tax upon withdrawal. Yet unlike these other retirement accounts, there is no legal limit to annuity contributions, and, unlike 401(k)s and traditional IRAs in particular, annuity withdrawals can be postponed inde…nitely. 7 Annuities do not strictly dominate brokerage accounts because of the tax penalties on withdrawals before age 59.5, because annuities do not o¤er single-stock trading, because annuities typically require a minimum balance of $10,000 or more, and because annuity providers assess penalties for withdrawals before the preset duration. 8 A typical annuity contract may assess a 7% surrender fee on the full amount of annual withdrawals, with the fee decreasing by 1% until the seven-year maturity. 9 Hence, withdrawals after only a year or two are heavily penalized.
Annuities are therefore attractive investments for households that have maxed out their Individual Retirement Account (IRA) contribution limits and are willing to sacri…ce liquidity for higher after-tax returns (Brown and Poterba 2006) . Based on the 2007-2009 Survey of Consumer Finances panel (introduced in the next section), 10.5% of U.S. households over age sixty hold assets in an annuity, and the typical new annuity investor is at or near retirement age, has over $200,000 in liquid …nancial wealth, and immediately places over $50,000 in the new annuity. 10 Annuities are o¤ered in two broad varieties: …xed and variable. I focus on in ‡ows to …xed annuities. Fixed annuities guarantee a …xed rate of return on invested assets. The …xed rate depends on the yield curve at the time of contract signing. Variable annuities o¤er investors asset allocation options across a handful of pre-speci…ed equity and other types of mutual funds. 11
Variable annuity assets can periodically be reallocated across funds and in particular be converted 7 A minority of annuity assets are held within IRAs, for example as an easy way to purchase a death bene…t rider. 8 Annuity income is taxed at ordinary income tax rates regardless of source, so variable annuities (de…ned below) which generate dividends and capital gains can be particularly inferior to brokerage accounts when held for short periods (Brown and Poterba 2006) .
9 Some …xed annuities carry higher surrender fees with higher …xed returns. "Section 1035" exchanges of one annuity contract for another are not considered withdrawals for tax purposes but are considered withdrawals for surrender fee purposes. There is a secondary market for …xed annuities but it is small and carries high transaction costs.
1 0 The 10.5% …gure refers to 2009; the analogous …gure from the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances which does not impose panel structure is nearly identical (10.4%). Age refers to the responding member of the household.
1 1 Variable annuities can include riders such as minimum bene…t riders that put a ‡oor on returns.
to …xed annuities before the pre-speci…ed maturity and without a surrender fee. In contrast, …xed annuity assets cannot be reallocated to equities or converted into variable annuities. Hence, …xed annuity in ‡ows are a consistent measure of households allocating wealth away from equities for several years at a time. In preferred speci…cations, I estimate the e¤ect of lagged S&P returns on in ‡ows to …xed annuities.
Finally, note that a unique subset of …xed annuities called indexed annuities o¤er limited equity exposure but do not confound the results below. Indexed annuities o¤er investors a variable return within a tight band; for example, a typical indexed annuity might o¤er a return of 0% if the S&P declines in a given year, a return of 3.5% if the S&P returns more than 3.5%, and the actual S&P return if the S&P returns between 0% and 3.5%. Indexed annuities were invented in the mid-1990s, 
III.A Annuity In ‡ows
This paper uses quarterly data on …xed annuity in ‡ows, variable annuity in ‡ows, and …xed annuity Fixed annuity in ‡ows equals the assets committed to new …xed annuity accounts. Variable annuity in ‡ows equals the assets committed to new variable annuity accounts. Total annuity in ‡ows equals …xed annuity in ‡ows plus variable annuity in ‡ows. Out ‡ows are not reported so these in ‡ows variables are not measured net of out ‡ows; however, out ‡ows are small due to the substantial surrender costs. The …xed annual rate of return on new …xed annuities ("…xed rate") equals the …xed rate of return o¤ered on the typical new …xed annuity as reported by LIMRA.
Though LIMRA has compiled more recent statistics on annuity in ‡ows, it stopped collecting …xed rate information in 2006.
III.B S&P Returns
The main analysis dataset comprises the quarterly annuity in ‡ows data merged with lagged S&P returns as published by Shiller (2014) . For a given quarter q, the n th lagged S&P return equals the percentage change between the average closing price of the S&P in the month preceding quarter q 4(n 2) and quarter q 4(n 1). Figure 3 shows the time series of the …xed rate and S&P returns; S&P returns exhibited no consistent trend while the …xed rate declined over time in line with other interest rates. Importantly for this paper's analysis of determinants of quarterly annuity in ‡ows, there is substantial independent variation at high frequencies in the …xed rate and S&P returns, due to high frequency changes in S&P returns. 
III.D Summary Statistics

IV S&P Returns and Fixed Annuity In ‡ows
If household investors chase stock market returns in order to ride a temporary bubble, they will not chase returns into illiquid assets that are expensive to sell in the short run. (1) with four S&P return lags, the preferred speci…cation. This …t closely matches the time series ‡uctuations in …xed annuity in ‡ows, including the large and sustained spike after the dot-com bust as well as smaller ‡uctuations throughout the time series. This is simple evidence that lagged S&P returns predict subsequent …xed annuity in ‡ows. Table 2 reports the coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors from the regressions underlying . 16 This pattern is perhaps unsurprising given the volatility of these di¤erent outcomes: reported expectations of short-run market returns are more volatile than …xed annuity in ‡ows, which in turn are more volatile than stock market participation rates. However, each of these three decay rates is measured with substantial error and under parametric assumptions, so caution is warranted in comparing their precise magnitudes.
V Robustness
The previous section found that S&P returns strongly negatively predict subsequent …xed annuity in ‡ows. This suggests that individual investors respond to poor S&P returns by allocating their wealth away from equities for years at a time, inconsistent with market-timing motives. However, there are at least three potential challenges to this conclusion. First, perhaps poor S&P returns cause …xed annuity in ‡ows to rise for features unrelated to its zero equity allocation; for example, perhaps household investors prefer both …xed-return and equity-linked investment accounts o¤ered by life insurance companies after incurring poor returns in brokerage accounts. Second, perhaps the results of equation (1) Figure 4 and Table 2 examined the e¤ect of S&P returns on …xed annuity in ‡ows in isolation, motivated by the unique illiquidity of …xed annuity allocations. However, perhaps S&P returns negatively a¤ect both …xed and variable annuity in ‡ows, indicating that the earlier results re ‡ect an overall annuity e¤ect and not a return chasing e¤ect. I address this possibility by repeating the previous section's analyses for the alternative outcome of the …xed annuity share of total (…xed plus variable) annuity in ‡ows. Analysis of the …xed annuity share of total annuity in ‡ows asks:
V.A Fixed-versus-Variable Annuity In ‡ows
conditional on a dollar being an invested in annuity, do lagged S&P returns predict whether the dollar is invested in a …xed annuity rather than a variable annuity? Figure 5 replicates Figure 4 for the …xed annuity share of total annuity in ‡ows. As in Figure   4 , each panel of Figure 5 displays the actual time series of the …xed annuity share of total annuity in ‡ows along with a …tted time series using equation (1) If S&P returns simply predict total annuity in ‡ows and not …xed annuity in ‡ows in particular, S&P return lags should not predict the …xed share of total annuity in ‡ows. Yet as in Figure 4 , Figure 5 shows that the addition of a single S&P return lag substantially improves the …t, and the addition of four S&P return lags yields a relatively tight …t of the overall time series. Table 3 columns 1-4 formalize these results. Column 4 is the preferred speci…cation. The coe¢ cients imply that a one-standard-deviation (15.6-percentage-point) higher S&P return last year, two years ago, three years ago, and four years ago reduce this quarter's …xed annuity in ‡ows by 5.9 percentage points, 4.4 percentage points, 5.0 percentage points, 4.0 percentage points, respectively. These magnitudes amount to respective reductions of 12%, 9%, 10%, and 8% of the mean …xed share of total annuity in ‡ows (47.8%)-broadly similar to the magnitudes of the preferred speci…cation of column 4. t-statistics on these e¤ects range from 3.7 to 8.2. Hence, the negative e¤ect of S&P returns on subsequent annuity in ‡ows is not simply an overall annuity e¤ect. Table 3 columns 5-8 present analogous evidence for variable annuity in ‡ows considered in isolation. The ability to rebalance variable annuity portfolios minimizes the direct relevance of these results, but analysis of variable annuity in ‡ows evaluates whether S&P returns have the anticipated positive e¤ect on equity-linked annuity in ‡ows, rather than the feared negative e¤ect. Indeed I …nd that across the speci…cations, lagged S&P returns have large positive and signi…cant e¤ects on subsequent variable annuity in ‡ows. Hence, individual investors respond to poor S&P returns by contributing to …xed annuities in particular, not just annuities generally.
V.B Multiplicative Time Trend
Equation (1) assumes that the dollar e¤ect of a given lagged S&P return on …xed annuity in ‡ows is time-invariant. However, Figure 2 showed an upward time trend in in ‡ows, suggesting that the responsiveness of in ‡ows to a given S&P lag may have increased over time and thus that (1) is mispseci…ed. I therefore replicate Table 2 columns 1-4 using the following alternative speci…cation that allows for a multiplicative time trend:
estimated with nonlinear least squares and with q beginning at 0. This speci…cation allows the sensitivity of …xed annuity in ‡ows to the regressors to rise over time alongside the rise over time in …xed annuity in ‡ows.
The results are reported in Table 2 columns 5-8. Column 8 shows that the coe¢ cients on the lagged S&P returns remain highly statistically signi…cant. Using to scale the coe¢ cients for the mean quarter, the coe¢ cients imply that a one-standard-deviation (15.6-percentage-point) higher S&P return last year, two years ago, three years ago, and four years ago reduce this quarter's …xed annuity in ‡ows by $2.9 billion, $2.1 billion, $1.6 billion, and $1.2 billion, respectively-similar to the magnitudes of the preferred speci…cation of column 4. 17 Thus the qualitative and quantitative results of the main speci…cations of Section IV hold under these alternative speci…cations.
VI Relevance for Household-Level Portfolios
The previous two sections documented the central …nding of the paper: household investors respond Finances introduced in Section III.C to measure whether the average household's decision to allocate assets to …xed annuities is associated with a substantial change in the household's share of …nancial assets allocated to equities. By examining mean changes in household-level equity shares, I produce estimates for the typical U.S. annuity investor.
Column 1 of Table 4a Table 4b shows that these di¤erences in equity exposure changes between new …xed annuity investors and new variable annuity investors are not driven by di¤erences in age, wealth, or initial equity exposure. The panel displays estimates from OLS regressions of the form: The term is the coe¢ cient of interest: the correlation between the household's decision to invest in a …xed rather than a variable annuity and the change in the average household's equity share.
Column 1 shows that without controls, new …xed annuity investors experienced a 35.5 percentage point decline in their equity share relative to new variable annuity investors-a magnitude equal to the di¤erence between the two mean changes listed in Table 4a . Columns 4-6 ask whether this large di¤erence is driven by selection into annuity type by successively controlling for quartics in household age, size of the household's 2007 …nancial assets, and the household's 2007 equity share of …nancial assets. The equity share change associated with the decision to invest in a …xed annuity remains largely constant at around 35 percentage points and very statistically signi…cant across these speci…cations.
Hence, households that invest in …xed annuities do not maintain a constant overall equity allocation by increasing the equity exposure of their non-annuity …nancial assets. Instead, the household decision to invest in a …xed annuity is associated with a large reduction in the household's overall equity exposure that is not explained by household demographics.
VII An Interpretation
The last three sections have demonstrated that individual investors respond to poor S&P returns by allocating wealth to …xed annuities and thus away from equities for years at a time, inconsistent. This challenges the riding-the-bubble explanation of return chasing because …xed annuity assets cannot be cheaply reallocated to equities in the near term. Such long-run return-chasing is quantitatively important for household asset allocations: household-level allocations to …xed annuities are associated with large reductions in household-level equity exposure. Thus it appears that recent S&P returns a¤ect households' long-run asset allocation plans, not just near-term trading strategies.
A natural question is what drives return chasing into illiquid assets. Time variation in asset allocations can of course be driven by time variation in expected returns, risk aversion, or discount rates, and time variation in these factors can produce observationally equivalent behavior. Returnchasing behavior is typically framed in terms of expected returns. Thus as a purely descriptive exercise in order to convey magnitudes under one candidate explanation, I ask what changes in the expected long-run equity return can explain the results, under the strong assumption that demand for …xed annuities is a¢ ne in the expected long-run equity premium akin to Kim and Omberg (1996) and Campbell and Viceira (1999) .
Speci…cally, suppose that on average over the population, demand for …xed annuities is a linear function of the expected long-run equity premium as well as a time trend to re ‡ect the secular trend in annuity in ‡ows:
whereR eq q+ denotes the annualized long-run (e.g. over the …ve-to-ten-year maturity of a typical annuity) equity return beginning in quarter q and where R f q denotes the average …xed rate of return o¤ered on …xed annuities purchased in quarter q. This a¢ ne demand approximation corresponds to the optimal portfolio rules derived in Kim and Omberg (1996) and Campbell and Viceira (1999) who consider environments with a risky asset that exhibits an AR(1) return premium over a riskless asset and investors who can rebalance frequently. 18 Further suppose that individual investors update their expectations of the long-run equity return using an unrestricted weighted average of the …rst-through-fourth S&P return lags:
Substituting (4) into (5), one simply derives the paper's main estimating equation (1). Thus one can use the coe¢ cient estimates of equation (1) to parameterize the underlying expectation formation weights p as the ratio of the responsiveness p of …xed annuity in ‡ows to S&P return lag p and the responsiveness of …xed annuity in ‡ows to the …xed rate:^ p = ^ p =^ . This is an intuitive expression: under (4), the expected equity premium rises when either the expected long-run equity return rises or when the …xed rate falls, and the responsiveness of …xed annuity in ‡ows to lagged S&P returns relative to the …xed rate pins down the degree to which S&P return lags a¤ect the expected long-run equity return.
Thus under these strong reduced-form assumptions, the coe¢ cient estimates reported in Table 2 column 4 imply that …xed annuity investors behave as if they raise their expectation of the long-run equity return by 6.6%, 5.1%, 3.7%, and 2.0% of the …rst-through-fourth Such updating would imply large changes in expectations of the long-run equity premium, including a decline of 8.7 percentage points from 1999 to 2003. However, I stress that this "as-if"analysis is purely descriptive and represents only one possible form of the underlying beliefs and preferences that motivate return chasing into illiquid assets.
VIII Conclusion
This paper has conducted a simple test of household motives when chasing stock market returns.
Households'reported expectations suggest that they chase returns in order to "ride the bubble"-buying in advance of a temporary stock market rally and selling in advance of a temporary declineimplying that they do not chase returns into illiquid assets. Fixed annuities are illiquid assets, and a rise in …xed annuity in ‡ows re ‡ects households locking additional wealth out of the stock market for several years at a time. I …nd that …xed annuity in ‡ows rise substantially after poor stock market returns, inconsistent with ride-the-bubble intentions and instead indicating buy-and-hold intentions. The results are consistent with households extrapolating recent stock market returns into the long run.
Subsequent work could advance these results in at least two directions. Positively, surveys that solicit household intentions at the moment of asset reallocations could further distinguish among return chasing motives. Normatively, the United States subsidizes three major types of retirement accounts: employer-provided accounts with limited annual contributions (401(k)s),
brokerage-provided accounts with limited annual contributions (IRAs), and insurer-provided accounts with unlimited contributions (annuities). To the extent that households face optimization frictions, detailed comparisons of how Americans use each account type could facilitate optimal retirement account design (Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick 2009; Chetty, Friedman, Leth-Petersen, Nielsen, and Olsen forthcoming). Notes -Panel A reports statistics from quarterly data on annuity inflows and annuity terms as published by LIMRA, the leading life insurance industry research group. Fixed annuity inflows equals the assets committed to new fixed annuity accounts in the quarter, and likewise for variable annuity inflows. Total annuity inflows equals the sum of fixed annuity inflows and variable annuity inflows. Table 1 and Section III for variable definitions. Columns 1-4 report coefficients from OLS regressions of quarterly fixed annuity inflows on the displayed combination of lagged S&P returns, the fixed rate of return on fixed annuities, and a linear time trend. Newey-West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation across sixteen quarterly lags are in parentheses. The implied effect of each lagged S&P return being one standard deviation above the mean (as in the late 1990s) equals the sum of the coefficients on the lagged S&P returns, multiplied by the standard deviation of lagged S&P returns reported in Table 1 . See Figures 4a-c for the time series fits generated by the regressions underlying columns 1, 3, and 4, respectively. Columns 5-8 replicate columns 1-4 while imposing a multiplicative time trend estimated using nonlinear least squares, which allows the sensitivity of fixed annuity inflows to the regressors to rise over time. The implied effect of one-standard-deviation-higher S&P return lags for these specifications is evaluated at the mean quarter; see Section V.B for the formula. Notes: Panel A plots the quarterly time series of total annuity inflows, equal to the sum of fixed annuity inflows and variable annuity inflows. Panel B plots the time series of fixed annuity inflows and variable annuity inflows separately. U.S. annuities are not annuities in the traditional economic sense: rather than lifetime income streams, U.S. annuities are tax-preferred savings vehicles into which households nearing retirement make typically large one-time contributions. Investors choose either a fixed (fixed-return) or variable (equity-linked) annuity at the time of contribution. Unlike variable annuity contributions, fixed annuity contributions cannot be reallocated across asset classes before the annuity's pre-specified maturity of typically five to ten years without triggering substantial surrender fees. Inflows are in 2010 dollars and gross of outflows (outflows are not available but small). Notes: This figure illustrates the ability of lagged S&P returns to explain quarterly fixed annuity inflows. The three panels plot the fitted time series generated by the OLS regressions underlying Table 2 columns 1, 3, and 4, respectively. Panel A plots actual fixed annuity inflows (as in Figure 2b ) and the fit generated by a regression of quarterly fixed annuity inflows on a linear time trend and the fixed rate of return offered on new fixed annuities. Panel B displays the fit generated when the quarter's first S&P return lag (the 12-month S&P return preceding the quarter) is included in the regression. Panel C displays the fit generated when the quarter's first-through-fourth S&P return lags (the four successive 12-month S&P returns over the 48 months preceding the quarter) are included in the regression. See Figures 2-3 Figure 4 for the outcome of the fixed annuity share of total annuity inflows, which equals fixed annuity inflows divided by the sum of fixed annuity inflows and variable annuity inflows. See the notes to Figures 2-3 for variable definitions and Figure 4 for specification details.
